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HOW INDEPENDENT IS THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC 
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE “DE FACTO”?
With the adoption of Regulation 2017/1939, the European Union 
created a legal framework for the creation of a European Public Pro-
secutor’s Office that will prosecute criminal offences against the finan-
cial interests of the European Union. In a number of issues that arise 
in connection with the forthcoming operation of this new EU body, one 
of the most important is certainly the issue of its independence. The 
paper first presents some observations on the independence of the State 
Attorney’s Office in national legal systems, and then analyses the inde-
pendence of the EPPO itself. The position of the EPPO in relation to 
other EU bodies, and in particular in relation to the Member States, 
is particularly emphasised. In order to try to answer the question of 
the independence of the EPPO as a whole, it is necessary to consi-
der interrelationships within the EPPO itself, and between the central 
(European) and national (European Delegated Prosecutor) levels.
Keywords: European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), indepen-
dence of prosecutors, European criminal law, protection of financial 
interests of the European Union
1. INTRODUCTION
Two decades on from the idea put forward in the Corpus Iuris,1 regulations 
have been enacted to provide for the establishment of the EPPO, which should 
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1 “The idea of founding the EPP (European Public Prosecutor) was first proposed in 1996 
by Klaus Hänsch, former President of the European Parliament (‘Ten concrete proposals to step 
up the fight against fraud’ presented by President Klaus Hänsch at the Interparliamentary Con-
ference, Brussels 23 and 24 April 1996)”. A. Csuri, “The Proposed European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office: From a Trojan Horse to a White Elephant” (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
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begin its operations by the end of 2020. The start-up of this Office should cer-
tainly help strengthen the protection of the financial interests of the European 
Union compared to the present situation where prosecution for these offences 
is exclusively left to the prosecutors’ offices of the Member States.2 In a whole 
series of questions that arise regarding the establishment of the EPPO, one of 
the most important is the issue of the independence of the EPPO. The indepen-
dence of the Office was a sticking point during the negotiations, since the sta-
tus of prosecutors in domestic legal systems varies throughout the EU.3
The complex structure of the EPPO, consisting of the European and natio-
nal levels (Delegated European Prosecutors), makes it difficult to assess inde-
pendence, and for an accurate assessment it is necessary to note the relations-
hip and powers between the central (European) and national level. In order to 
understand the underlying problems, which arise mostly from the differences 
in the national legal orders, we must first observe the position of the prosecu-
tion services in national legal systems.
2. GENERAL OBSERVATION ON THE POSITION OF 
PROSECUTION SERVICE IN NATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS
The position of prosecutors in criminal proceedings in much of the world 
has changed significantly in recent decades. Certainly, the most important 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1939: “Both the Union and the Member States of the European Union 
have an obligation to protect the Union’s financial interests against criminal offences, which 
generate significant financial damages every year. Yet, these offences are currently not always 
sufficiently investigated and prosecuted by the national criminal justice authorities”. So, lack of 
interest or sufficient efforts on the part of Member States to prosecute those offences that do not 
directly affect their financial interests is the main reason. But it must be noted that the possible 
lack of interest on the part of states to prosecute such crimes is “short-sighted”, since only a 
small percentage goes to the EU administration from the EU budget, while the largest part goes 
back to the Member States, either through structural and cohesion funds or through incentives. 
Therefore, crimes to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests also indirectly damage Member 
States’ budgets, albeit to a much lesser extent than acts that directly damage the national budget, 
such as national tax evasion. Regarding the reason for founding the EPPO, certain similarities 
with the founding of international criminal courts cannot be avoided. The reason for setting up 
international criminal courts is the bias of national courts when it comes to bringing to justice 
the perpetrators of offences deemed to have been committed in the national interest, which shows 
itself as a lack of interest for the prosecution of “its perpetrators” (and, of course, the excessive, 
unobjective interest for the prosecution of possible perpetrators of the “other side”) .
2 The concept of a European prosecution service, as proposed in the Corpus Juris study, 
aimed to tackle impediments to the prosecution of transnational fraud cases, namely substan-
tive disparities in national criminal justice systems and the reluctance of Member States to 
initiate prosecutions. Csuri (n 1) p 150.
3 V. Mitsilegas, F. Giuffrida, “Raising the Bar? Thoughts on the Establishment of the Euro-
pean Public Prosecutor’s Office”, CEPS Policy Insight No. 2017-39, 30 November 2017, p 7.
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change is that prosecutors have received significantly greater powers in the 
criminal justice system, mostly those of a discretionary nature. This phenome-
non is usually interpreted as a reaction to an increase in the caseload which, 
together with the restriction of budget resources for public prosecutors’ offices 
and criminal justice, leads to an overload of the criminal justice systems. Jehle 
states that in principle there are three possible ways of dealing with the incre-
ased number of criminal proceedings: 1) increasing prosecution service and 
court personnel (Jehle justifiably considers this option, connected as it is with 
significant additional costs, as unrealistic); 2) decriminalisation of material 
law, where the threat of a criminal sanction is removed for less serious breac-
hes of the law; and 3) discretion used by the police or the prosecution service 
and simplified rules of criminal procedure.4 Today, the most widely used way 
to reduce the aforementioned overload is to reduce the number of cases that 
reach the trial stage by giving prosecutors greater discretionary powers to 
avoid prosecution or to end it at early stages of the proceedings. 
This results in a significant expansion of the powers of the prosecutor, who 
increasingly and in a variety of ways end criminal cases.5 At the same time, 
this partially implies the transfer of a significant part of the power from judges 
to prosecutors.
Of course, with these relatively newly acquired broader discretionary 
powers to avoid or end criminal prosecution, prosecutors always have the tra-
ditional power to decide to prosecute, without which, in accordance with the 
principle of accusation, there can be no criminal proceedings before a court. 
Weigend therefore calls the prosecutor a “judge by another name”.6 
Thus, it is no surprise that more and more researchers consider prosecutors 
as possibly the most influential subjects in the criminal justice system.7 There-
fore, with the rise of prosecutorial power, the question of the independence and 
accountability of prosecution is becoming increasingly important.
4 J.-M. Jehle, “The Function of Public Prosecution within the Criminal Justice System” in 
J.-M. Jehle and M. Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise of 
Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (Springer, 2006) pp 5-6.
5 See J. Gutmann, S. Voigt, “The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Account-
ability”, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 8, University of Hamburg, 2017, p 2.
6 T. Weigend, “A Judge by Another Name? Comparative Perspectives on the Role of the 
Public Prosecutor” in E. Luna and M. Wade (eds), The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspec-
tive (Oxford University Press, 2012) pp 377–391, as cited in S. Voigt, A.J. Wulf, “What Makes 
Prosecutors Independent? Analysing the Institutional Determinants of Prosecutorial Indepen-
dence” (2017) 15(1) Journal of Institutional Economics, p 100.
7 M. Tonry, “Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective” (2012) 14(1) Crime 
and Justice, pp 1-33. For prosecutors in the USA, Davis claims that “prosecutors are the most 
powerful officials in the American criminal justice system. A.J. Davis, “The Power and Dis-
cretion of the American Prosecutor” (2005) 49(1) Droit et Cultures, pp 55-66. Weigend (n 6) 
pp 383-389.
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In some countries, the prosecutor is part of the judiciary in the broader 
sense while in other countries prosecutors may be part of the executive or may 
have the same status as lawyers.8 The independence of prosecutors has two 
aspects: internal and external. The internal independence of a prosecutor refers 
to the internal relations within the prosecution service, i.e. the relation between 
prosecutors of lower rank and their superiors – in States with a hierarchical 
structure, it is possible for higher-ranked prosecutors from a higher prosecu-
tor’s office to deliver instructions to lower-ranked ones.9 External indepen-
dence means that no authority or person outside the prosecution service is 
authorised to give guidelines or instructions to a prosecutor on the handling of 
a specific case. In other words, in the exercise of their competences, the prose-
cutors are subject only to the Constitution and laws.10
2.1. Independence and accountability of prosecution 
2.1.1. Independence
The issue of the independence of courts and judges is, at the normative 
level, much more highly regulated and much better researched in legal science, 
unlike the issue of the independence of prosecution services and prosecutors 
which has received much less attention.11 The independence of courts and jud-
ges is understood in much of the modern democratic world as an indispensable 
element of the rule of law. But with the independence of public prosecutors, 
things are not so simple. The central issue here is certainly the independence 
of prosecution in relation to the other two branches of government.12 Particu-
larly dangerous are the efforts of the executive to misuse the work of the cri-
minal justice system through the prosecution service. Weigend thus states that 
“the executive may exercise undue influence over prosecutors to protect gover-
nment members, interest groups and supporting elites from criminal prosecu-
tion or, on the contrary, use its influence on prosecutors to repress citizens, 
businesses and political opposition if such behavior promises to enhance its 
own goals”.13
8 However, it must be underlined that being part of the judiciary does not always mean the 
same rules for both judges and prosecutors. European Network of Councils for the Judiciary 
(ENCJ), “Independence and Accountability of the Prosecution”. ENCJ Report 2014-2016, pp 4-5.
9 Ibid., p 52.
10 Ibid, pp 52-53.
11 See Voigt and Wulf (n 6) p 100.
12 Ibid.
13 Weigend (n 6) pp 383–9, as cited in Voigt and Wulf (n 6) p 100. Such behaviour of pol-
iticians and other influential figures is not limited to non-democratic regimes or developing 
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Gutmann and Voigt suggest prosecutorial independence “as a state in which 
prosecutors have no reason to expect that their lawful professional activities 
will result in negative consequences for themselves, such as being expelled, 
being transferred to another position or location, or being paid less”.14 They 
emphasise that prosecutorial independence, thus, refers to the relationship 
between prosecutors and the government, and is logically distinct from the 
presence or absence of corruption because prosecutors could be independent 
from governmental interference and still lack impartiality if they are willing 
to accept bribes or behave in other corrupt ways.15
It is important to emphasise that guarantees of the independence of prose-
cution written in legal documents do not always mean that this would indeed 
be achieved in practice. Therefore, it is interesting to mention the research of 
Van Aaken, Feld and Voigt in 2010,16 where they attempted not only to mea-
sure the independence of prosecutors de iure and de facto, but also to establish 
if there is correlation between the two. They came to a rather unexpected conc-
lusion – they found that these two kinds of independence are in most cases 
negatively correlated. In many countries where the independence of prosecu-
tion is de iure lower, they have de facto higher independence.17 Trying to 
explain this correlation, the authors suggest the following explanation. Some 
international organisations require different reforms from countries that seek 
to join that organisation or obtain financial aid. One of the common require-
ments is a stronger fight against corruption and strengthening the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. So, in an attempt to accede, countries which have serious 
problems with the independence of the judiciary are “forced” to adopt new 
legislation that provides de iure a very high level of judicial independence. So, 
as Van Aaken, Feld and Voigt suggest, the causality could be reversed, that is, 
that a high level of (perceived) corruption is the cause of legislative changes to 
strengthen the independence of prosecution. 18 But the authors emphasise that 
the de facto independence of prosecutors is not determined by well-intentio-
ned declarations (i.e., fresh legislation), but by the actual behaviour of govern-
ment representatives over a long period.19 
countries. Iglesias has written on the pressures he and his fellow prosecutors experienced in the 
US. D.C. Iglesias, “A Prosecutor’s Non-negotiables: Integrity and Independence (2010) 44(4) 
Georgia Law Review, pp 939-952.
14 Gutmann and Voigt (n 5) p 3. 
15 Ibid.
16 A. Van Aaken, L.P. Feld, and S. Voigt, “Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political 
Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation across 78 Countries” (2010) 12(1) American Law and 
Economics Review, pp 204–244.
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More elaborations of the relation between de jure and de facto prosecutorial 
independence are brought by Voigt and Wolf. They enquire more systematically 
into the determinants of the de facto independence of prosecutors.20 The aut-
hors emphasise that the establishment of a high level of de facto judicial inde-
pendence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for ensuring that justice 
prevails in criminal cases.21 The reasons why the independence of prosecutors 
is also very important, perhaps even more important than the independence of 
judges, are numerous. One of the most important is that prosecutors can protect 
someone (close to the government) by deciding not to prosecute, without even 
starting criminal prosecution and a criminal procedure. By doing so, the suspect 
avoids not only criminal punishment, but also the negative publicity that comes 
with criminal proceedings at the trial stage if the suspect is well known to the 
general public. On the other hand, prosecutors can initiate investigation against 
someone (e.g. a political opponent of the current government) and cause great 
damage to the public image of that person even if the court refuses to confirm 
the indictment and start the trial due to an obvious lack of evidence. Voigt and 
Wulf discuss why a government would want to infringe the independence of 
prosecutors and why the protection of this independence is thus crucial to the 
rule of law. They state that from the viewpoint of a government, it may even be 
more attractive to erode the independence of prosecutors than to compromise 
the independence of the judiciary because the former may lead to less opposi-
tion and, hence, be less costly for the government.22
The executive can exercise influence on the judiciary and the prosecution 
agency for various reasons. Among these, according to Voigt and Wulf, one 
can broadly distinguish between two types of objectives: a) the government 
may want to end a legitimate criminal proceeding against one of its members 
or members of the supporting elites; and b) it may want to initiate an illegiti-
mate criminal case to tarnish the reputation of some opponent, or even wron-
gfully convict that individual.23 To fulfil these objectives, it has various met-
hods at its disposal: incentives (such as bribes, salary increases, promotions, 
etc.) or disincentives (such as salary cuts, demotions, disciplinary transfers, 
forced retirement, etc.).24 The potential costs of administering these methods 
to judges are always higher than administering them to prosecuting authorities 
because infringing judicial independence is a government action that is more 
visible and thus also more easily detectable than a comparable infringement 
20 Voigt and Wulf (n 6) pp 99–120.
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aimed at the prosecution authority. 25 It is therefore also likely to lead to fiercer 
resistance. From a government’s point of view, looking at some corrupt 
“cost-benefit” analysis, exercising an influence on the prosecution authority is 
likely to lead to comparable results at lower costs than using the same means 
against the judiciary. Thus, it is a more appealing option, because it can bring 
the same benefits at lower risk.26
2.1.2. Accountability
Freedom should always be accompanied by responsibility, so prosecutors 
must be accountable for their work, just like judges. The independence of both 
judges and prosecutors is not a right that can exist without such accountabili-
ty.27 How can accountability be defined? We could say that it entails making a 
body exercising power answerable to an external authority and with the possi-
ble consequence of sanctions.28 Some authors state that accountability can be 
understood further as being linked to the rule of law in that the rule of law has 
a shared, open, and public character that in an objective way binds the exercise 
of power to determinate legal rules in as far as possible.29 But accountability 
can also be interpreted in the sense that it goes further than the rule of law in 
implying a kind of answerability and subordination to an outside political aut-
hority, which leads to tension between the idea of political subordination 
implicit in the idea of accountability and the independence of prosecutors.30 As 
Gutmann and Voigt warn, “prosecutorial independence is no panacea. Prose-
cutors might misuse their independence to prosecute crimes that have never 
been committed, or not prosecute crimes that have been committed”.31 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 ENCJ Report (n 8) p 5.
28 M. Bovens, “Analyzing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” 
(2007) 13(4) European Law Journal, pp 453-454; D. Curtin & A. Nollkaemper, “Conceptual-
izing Accountability in International and European Law” (2005) 26 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law p 4; R. Mulgan, “‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?” (2000) 
78(3) Public Administration, p 555, all the above as cited in G. Conway, “Holding to Account 
a Possible European Public Prosecutor, Supranational Governance and Accountability Across 
Diverse Legal Traditions” (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum, pp 374-375.
29 B Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) pp 114–126; B. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), as cited in Conway (n 28) p 375.
30 Conway (n 28) p 375.
31 Gutmann and Voigt (n 5) p 8. The authors further state that prosecutors might do so to 
pursue their own political agenda. For example, prosecutors might choose the timing of their 
prosecutorial action strategically.
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In national legal orders, the accountability of prosecution services depends 
on various factors. One of them is legal tradition. The basic differences are that 
in the common law tradition, the roles of the actors in the criminal justice 
system are more greatly separated, (i.e. the police have almost total autonomy 
from the prosecutor during investigation), while in the civil law tradition the 
“interaction of actors is much more blurred”.32, 33 
The EPPO will be accountable to the European Parliament, to the Council 
and to the Commission for its general activities and will issue annual reports.34 
This solution should be welcomed. The possible accountability of individual 
members of the EPPO, especially EDPs, will be considered in the following 
sections. 
3. STRUCTURE OF THE EPPO AND ITS INDEPENDENCE 
3.1. Structure of the EPPO
Over the last two decades, different models of organisation of the EPPO 
have been considered. White differentiates between: 1) reinforced horizontal 
cooperation under Art. 85 TFEU; 2) a decentralised service under Art. 85 
TFEU; and 3) a vertical European public prosecutor’s office under Art. 86 
TFEU.35 Ligeti and Simonato consider: 1) a college model; 2) a centralised 
model; and 3) an integrated model.36
32 For a more detailed overview of the main differences of the accountability of the police 
and the prosecution in common law and civil law traditions, see Conway (n 28) pp 376-390.
33 In some legal systems, the lack of control over prosecutorial discretion and its work 
in general is astonishing, as in the USA, where US attorneys have very broad discretion. C. 
Gomez-Jara Diez and E. Herlin-Karnell cite one US attorney: “The discretionary power to 
decide whether to prosecute is awesome”, and conclude that this power is so formidable that, 
“if the United States Attorney abuses this power, the only available remedy is removal”. C. 
Gomez-Jara Diez and E. Herlin-Karnell, “Prosecuting EU Financial Crimes: The European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office in Comparison to the US Federal Regime” (2018) 19(5) German 
Law Journal, p 1214. Davis states that it is “unclear why the electorate, the judiciary, and 
legislature have taken such a ‘hands-off’ approach with the American prosecutor”. She sug-
gests that one reason could be the nature of prosecutorial responsibilities, because prosecutors 
enforce the law against people accused of committing crimes – a very unpopular group in a 
country that has an extremely punitive approach. The author comes to the possible conclusion 
that because law enforcement is such a high priority in the USA and since the victims of pros-
ecutorial misconduct are so unpopular, the electorate, legislature, and judiciary may be less 
concerned with fairness in the prosecutorial process. Davis (n 7) p 464.
34 Art. 6(2) of the EPPO Regulation.
35 S. White, “Towards a Decentralized European Public Prosecutor’s Office” (2013) 4 New 
Journal of European Criminal Law, pp 30-38.
36 K. Ligeti, M. Simonato, “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Towards a Truly 
European Prosecution Service” (2013) 4 New Journal of European Criminal Law, pp 7-21. The 
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Due to the different factors, especially the refusal of Member States to 
accept centralisation of the EPPO, Regulation 2017/1939 establishes the EPPO 
with an integrated, yet decentralised, structure consisting of two levels: a cen-
tral (European) level and a national level. At the central level, we have the 
following members of the EPPO: the European Chief Prosecutor and 22 
European Prosecutors (one per participating Member State) from among 
whom two deputies of the European Chief Prosecutor are chosen. At the nati-
onal level, there are European Delegated Prosecutors (hereinafter: EDPs) who 
are considered members of the EPPO and who act at the national level.
Particularly interesting and complex is the fact that the EDPs are characte-
rised by the so-called “double hat” status:37 they will remain national prose-
cutors but at the same time they will be part of the EPPO.38 The main advan-
tage of this “double hat” approach is anchoring the European office into the 
national systems and thereby ensuring a certain proximity to the field work of 
investigations.39
When it comes to disadvantages, the “double hat” status raises concerns 
regarding the independence of EDPs and therefore of the EPPO in general. As 
authors further explain that the “integrated model” is a development of the idea contained in 
the Corpus Juris, as it combines the need for hierarchy in the investigative phase with respect 
for the peculiarities of national legal orders as well as of national sovereignty. According to 
their interpretation, this model is “integrated” for two reasons. From a structural point of view, 
the integrated EPPO would consist of a “head” at the central level and “arms” in the form of 
delegated EPPs in the Member States. The central level and the delegated EPPs in the Mem-
ber States would form a single body, i.e. the delegated EPPs would be an integral part of the 
European office. From the viewpoint of available resources, the integrated model would benefit 
from the existing resources both at national and EU level. Accordingly, the integrated EPPO 
would consist of a central EU prosecutor’s office assisted by delegated prosecutors at national 
level who are integrated into the national criminal justice systems (p 15). During the process 
of negotiating and choosing the best possible internal structure of the EPPO, both non-legis-
lative documents and professional circles favoured a hierarchical structure for the EPPO. L. 
Hamran, E. Szabova, “European Public Prosecutor’s Office - Cui Bono” (2013) 4 New Journal 
of European Criminal Law, p 51.
37 Authors who use this term include Ligeti and Simonato (n 36) p 15. 
38 The double hat approach has had many proponents from the very beginning of the idea 
itself, since the Corpus Iuris.
39 Ligeti and Simonato (n 36) p 15. The authors state that this peculiar status of EDPs 
should ensure that the EPPO receives information about cases that are within its competence. 
Csuri explains that “the endless compromises required to keep the Member States in the 
EPPO project have shifted the focus of negotiations from how to create a European body with 
identical investigative powers to how to integrate the future European body into the different 
national legal systems. As a result, the latest drafts envisage a system where prosecutorial 
decisions are made in a complex college model”. A. Csuri, “The Proposed European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office: From a Trojan Horse to a White Elephant” (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, p 150.
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Ligeti and Simonato point out, “the double hat delegate is confronted with the 
dilemma of serving two masters simultaneously” and therefore the status of 
“double hat” EDPs needs to be carefully addressed.40 Satzger also raises the 
question whether EDPs could really be “expected to independently serve two 
masters”.41 Mitsilegas and Giufrida wrote that this status “raises concerns 
about the actual independence they will enjoy when dealing with the crimes 
affecting the Union’s financial interests”.42 We will elaborate on this problem 
in more detail below. It is not surprising that the most important issue, when it 
comes to securing independence but also securing responsibility, is the que-
stion of the manner of appointment and the possibility of dismissal and disci-
plinary proceedings of members of the EPPO.
3.1.1. Appointment and dismissal of the members of the EPPO
3.1.1.1. Appointment and dismissal of EPPO members at the central level
Provisions on the appointment of EPPO members are provided in Art. 
14-17 of the EPPO Regulation. The European Chief Prosecutor is appointed by 
the European Parliament and the Council from a list of candidates chosen by 
the selection panel, for a non-renewable term of 7 years.43 Regarding the acco-
untability and possible dismissal of the European Chief Prosecutor, the Regu-
lation puts the Court of Justice in charge of his/her dismissal, upon the appli-
cation of the European Parliament, of the Council, or of the Commission. The 
Court of Justice may dismiss the European Chief Prosecutor if it finds that he/
40 Ligeti and Simonato (n 36) p 16.
41 H. Satzger, “The Future European Public Prosecutor and the National Prosecution: 
Potential Conflicts and How They Could Be Avoided” in P. Asp (ed), The European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office – Legal and Criminal Policy Perspectives (Stiftelsen Skrifter utgivna av 
Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet, 2015), as cited in V. Mitsilegas, F. Giuffrida, 
“Raising the Bar? Thoughts on the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
CEPS Policy Insight No. 2017-39 / 30 November 2017, p 5.
42 Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (n 41) p 19.
43 Art 14 of Regulation 2017/1939. The European Chief Prosecutor shall be selected from 
among candidates: (a) who are active members of the public prosecution service or judiciary 
of the Member States, or active European Prosecutors; (b) whose independence is beyond 
doubt; (c) who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest prosecutorial 
or judicial offices in their respective Member States and have relevant practical experience 
of national legal systems, financial investigations and of international judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, or have served as European Prosecutors, and (d) who have sufficient mana-
gerial experience and qualifications for the position.
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she is no longer able to perform his/her duties, or that he/she is guilty of serious 
misconduct.44
The College of the EPPO consists of the European Chief Prosecutor and 
one European Prosecutor per Member State. The College appoints two 
European Prosecutors to serve as Deputy European Chief Prosecutors for a 
renewable term of 3 years, which must not exceed the periods for their manda-
tes as European Prosecutors.45 The Deputy European Chief Prosecutors retain 
their status as European Prosecutors.46 
European prosecutors are appointed by the Council (acting by simple majo-
rity) for a non-renewable term of 6 years. Each Member State nominates three 
candidates for the position of European Prosecutor from among candidates: (a) 
who are active members of the public prosecution service or judiciary of the 
relevant Member State; (b) whose independence is beyond doubt; and (c) who 
possess the qualifications required for appointment to high prosecutorial or 
judicial office in their respective Member States, and who have relevant practi-
cal experience of national legal systems, of financial investigations and of 
international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. After having received 
the reasoned opinion of the selection panel referred to in Article 14(3) of Regu-
lation, the Council selects and appoints one of the candidates to be the European 
Prosecutor of the Member State in question (Art. 16(1) and (2). Regarding the 
dismissal of European prosecutors, the same rules apply. The Court of Justice 
is also in charge of dismissal, upon an application of the European Parliament, 
of the Council, or of the Commission, if it finds that the prosecutor is no longer 
able to perform his/her duties or that he/she is guilty of serious misconduct 
(Art. 16(5)).
3.1.1.2. Appointment and dismissal of the European Delegated 
Prosecutors
European Delegated Prosecutors are appointed by the College upon a pro-
posal by the European Chief Prosecutor. But the College can only appoint 
candidates who are nominated by the Member States. The EPPO Regulation 
sets some criteria for candidates. The European Delegated Prosecutors must, 
44 Art. 14(5) of the EPPO Regulation. Van Gerven suggests that a “fully independent EPP 
must be appointed at the highest judicial level of the Community and therefore at the level of 
the ECJ”. W. Van Gerven, “Constitutional Conditions for a Public Prosecutor’s Office at the 
European Level” (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
p 318. 
45 The selection process is regulated by the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO.
46 Art. 15(1) of the EPPO Regulation.
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from the time of their appointment as European Delegated Prosecutors until 
dismissal, be active members of the public prosecution service or judiciary of 
the respective Member States which nominated them. Their independence 
must be beyond doubt and they must possess the necessary qualifications and 
relevant practical experience of their national legal system. If the College 
believes that the candidate nominated by a Member State does not fulfil this 
criterion, it may reject that person (Art. 17(1) and (2)).
Regarding the accountability of EDPs, unlike the rules about the dismissal 
of the European Chief Prosecutor and European prosecutors, the College itself 
is in charge of the dismissal of EDPs if it finds that they no longer fulfil the 
mentioned criteria, are unable to perform their duties, or are guilty of serious 
misconduct.
A very important element in considering the independence of EDPs is the 
possibility of the EPPO and Member States dismissing or instituting discipli-
nary proceedings against an EDP for different reasons. Regarding this possibi-
lity, we must differentiate between the reasons for such action that relate to an 
EDP’s responsibilities under the EPPO Regulation and those that do not. A 
Member State can dismiss or take disciplinary action against its EDP without 
the consent of the European Chief Prosecutor only in the latter case. 
Nevertheless, the respective Member State must inform the European Chief 
Prosecutor before taking such action. A Member State may not dismiss, or 
take disciplinary action against, its European Delegated Prosecutor for reasons 
connected with his/her responsibilities under the EPPO Regulation without the 
consent of the European Chief Prosecutor. If the European Chief Prosecutor 
does not consent, the Member State concerned may request the College to 
review the matter (Art. 17(4)).
3.1.2. Independence of the EPPO
The issue of EPPO independence is as significant as the independence of 
prosecutors in national legal systems. Since criminal offences under the juris-
diction of the EPPO may often involve perpetrators or suspects who are mem-
bers of the ruling political elite (e.g. deputy ministers deciding on the alloca-
tion of European funds, etc.), the issue of prosecutor independence is even 
more significant. Differences in the position of prosecution services in national 
legal systems are inevitably reflected in the attitude towards the EPPO, namely 
the independence of the EPPO. While many neutral observers “fight” for the 
broader independence of the EPPO, it is interesting and illuminating to men-
tion the case of the Netherlands, which initially refused to participate in this 
mechanism of enhanced cooperation precisely because of the independence of 
the Office, “a feature running counter to a fundamental principle of the Dutch 
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legal system, where the public prosecution service follows the (general, and 
sometimes specific) instructions of the Minister of Justice, who is in turn acco-
untable to the national Parliament”.47 
In the following part, we make a distinction between the independence of 
the EPPO in relation to other EU bodies and in relation to Member States 
(external independence) and the independence of members of the EPPO in 
relation to each other (internal independence).
3.1.2.1. External independence
a) Independence from European Union institutions
The EPPO is established as a body of the Union, with legal personality.48 
According to Art. 6 of the EPPO Regulation, the members of the EPPO must 
be independent and must neither seek nor take instructions from any institu-
tion, body, office or agency of the Union in the performance of their duties 
under the Regulation. The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union must respect the independence of the EPPO and must not seek to 
influence it in the exercise of their tasks.
After this overview of legal norms, we can ask if there might be a success-
ful way for someone from other EU bodies and institutions to influence the 
work of the EPPO in some case? In my opinion, such a scenario is not particu-
larly likely. Considering the detailed procedures in which decisions are brou-
ght in the European Commission, in the Council, and especially in the 
European Parliament, the chances of some individual or a small group misu-
sing its power to influence the decision process in specific cases are rather 
small. One of the potential ways that national Chief Prosecutors in national 
legal systems could be influenced is the situation where politicians (who are in 
most cases in charge of choosing the Chief Prosecutor in the national parlia-
47 See M. Zwiers, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Analysis of a Multilevel Crim-
inal Justice System (Intersentia, 2011) pp 64–65; W. Geelhoed, “Embedding the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office in Jurisdictions with a Wide Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion: The 
Dutch Example” in C. Nowak (ed), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and National 
Authorities (Kluwer-CEDAM, 2016) pp 96-98, as cited by Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (n 41) p 7.
48 Art. 3 of the Regulation. To guarantee the full autonomy and independence of the EPPO, 
it should be granted an autonomous budget, with revenue coming essentially from a contri-
bution from the budget of the Union. The financial, budgetary and staff regime of the EPPO 
should follow the relevant Union standards applicable to bodies referred to in Article 208 of 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), 
with due regard, however, to the fact that the competence of the EPPO to carry out criminal 
investigations and prosecutions at Union level is unique (Recital 111 of the Regulation).
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ment) promise that they will support him/her in running for a second term in 
exchange for benefits (usually dismissing the prosecution of some members of 
that political party who are considered suspects or even defendants of criminal 
offences). But the term of the European Chief Prosecutor and European prose-
cutors are not renewable and therefore such a possibility does not exist.
b) Independence from Member States
The question of the independence of the EPPO in relation to Member Sta-
tes is more problematic. According to Art. 6 of the Regulation, the EPPO is 
independent of the Member States and the “Member States of the European 
Union … shall respect the independence of the EPPO and shall not seek to 
influence it in the exercise of its tasks”. At a normative level, this looks satis-
factory,49 but we should ask if it could happen that some Member State tries 
to obstruct some prosecution led by the EPPO. One could argue that it is not 
very likely this could happen, because the Member States that do not want the 
EPPO to be responsible for crimes against the financial interests of the EU 
simply will not accept it, i.e. they will refuse to participate in this form of 
enhanced cooperation within the EU. But things are not that simple and static. 
For example, one government or one political option could accept this, but the 
political situation could very quickly change and a new political option that 
forms the government and the parliamentary majority could have a much less 
benevolent attitude towards the EPPO. On the other hand, an even more likely 
scenario is that some Member State generally supports the creation and fun-
ction of the EPPO, but wants to stop one particular prosecution case, e.g. the 
criminal prosecution of a highly ranked member of the leading political party 
who is suspected of some criminal offence against the financial interests of 
the EU. For these reasons, it is necessary to ask if there are possibilities for 
Member States to undermine criminal investigation and prosecution led by 
the EPPO in such cases? I believe that such a possibility exists, but to fully 
comprehend the problem, first we must analyse the question of internal inde-
pendence within the EPPO. 
49 Some authors are optimistic regarding the relation with the Member States, such as Tilovs-
ka-Kechedji who states that “the independence of such body will ensure that investigations and 
prosecutions will be dealt with and taken to national courts, without the influence and delay of 
national authorities”. E. Tilovska-Kechedji, “European Public Prosecutor’s Office: To Be or Not 
to Be” (2017) 81 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, p 82.
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3.1.2.2. Internal (in)dependence within EPPO.
Most countries today have some form of hierarchy and subordination as the 
main feature of the internal organisation of the prosecution service.50 The 
majority of Member States that are participating in the establishment of the 
EPPO as a form of enhanced cooperation are no exception.51 
Inside the EPPO, relations between the central (European) and national 
level could be described as follows: the central level will supervise the investi-
gations and prosecutions carried out at the national level. So, Permanent 
Chambers can give instructions to the handling European Delegated Prosecu-
tor, where it is necessary for the efficient handling of the investigation or pro-
secution, in the interest of justice, or to ensure the coherent functioning of the 
EPPO (Art. 10(5) of the EPPO Regulation). In this case, the Permanent Cham-
ber acts through the European Prosecutor who supervises the investigation or 
the prosecution. It is also very important to say that the mentioned Art. 10(5) 
of the EPPO Regulation regulates that these instructions must be “in com-
pliance with applicable national law”. 
3.1.2.3. Possible problems with independence in relation to Member 
States – the status of EDPs
Art. 26(3) of the EPPO Regulation states that: “Where no investigation has 
been initiated by a European Delegated Prosecutor, the Permanent Chamber to 
which the case has been allocated shall, under the conditions set out in para-
graph 1, instruct a European Delegated Prosecutor to initiate an investigation”. 
But what if the EDP does not follow this instruction or otherwise does somet-
hing that could be considered serious misconduct? How is the accountability 
of the EDP addressed? The Regulation mentions the disciplinary responsibi-
lity of EDPs: “The College should be responsible for disciplinary procedures 
concerning European Delegated Prosecutors acting under this Regulation. 
Since European Delegated Prosecutors remain active members of the public 
prosecution or the judiciary of the Member States, and may also exercise fun-
ctions as national prosecutors, national disciplinary provisions may apply for 
reasons not connected with this Regulation. However, in such cases the 
European Chief Prosecutor should be informed of the dismissal or of any dis-
50 For a summary of the study of prosecution in European countries, see the ENCJ Report 
(n 8) pp 50-51.
51 As reasons for such a hierarchical internal structure of prosecution services, unlike the 
structure of the court system, a few basic arguments are usually stated, the most important of 
which is securing a uniform prosecution policy.
104
M. Pajčić: How Independent is the European Public Prosecutor’s Office “de facto”?
Hrvatski ljetopis za kaznene znanosti i praksu (Zagreb), vol. 27, broj 1/2020, str. 89-109.
ciplinary action, given his responsibilities for the management of the EPPO 
and in order to protect its integrity and independence”.52 It is important also to 
mention that the College must adopt internal rules of procedure of the EPPO 
in accordance with Article 21 and must further stipulate the responsibilities for 
the performance of the functions of the members of the College and the staff 
of the EPPO.53 
Regarding the independence of EDPs in relation to Member States, it is 
interesting to mention that Art. 17(2) of the Regulation leaves open the possibi-
lity not only for members of the public prosecution service but also members of 
the judiciary (judges) of the respective Member States to be nominated and 
appointed as EDPs. Taking into account the “double hat” status, to ensure the 
independence of European Delegated Prosecutors it would be more suitable for 
them to be judges rather than members of the national public prosecutors’ 
office, because the independence of judges in most Member States is, not only 
at the normative level but also in reality, better protected than that of prosecu-
tors. Therefore, the potential for national structures to influence or put pressure 
on an EDP who is a public prosecutor in his or her country is also much greater 
than the potential to influence an EDP who is a judge. But this solution is rather 
unpractical and probably unrealistic. It is hard to expect judges who do not have 
previous experience as prosecutors to perform well a prosecutorial function. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Justice and politics are not sisters.  
As soon as politics enters the temple, justice immediately rushes out of it.54
The legal regulation of prosecutorial independence is a very sensitive and 
complex issue, even in national legal systems where great differences can be 
seen. The complexity is further compounded when it comes to the legal regu-
lation of this matter by the EPPO, given the decentralised structure of the 
EPPO and the fact that European Delegated Prosecutors are also active mem-
bers of national prosecutors’ offices or judicial bodies.
Is the EPPO Regulation indeed, as Mitsilegas and Giufrida stated, “proba-
bly the boldest and most ambitious instrument of EU (criminal) law adopted 
52 Recital 46 of the EPPO Regulation.
53 Art. 9(4) of the EPPO Regulation.
54 Carrara, as cited in H. Olásolo, “The Prosecutor of the ICC before the Initiation of 
Investigations: A Quasi-judicial or a Political Body? (2003) 3 International Criminal Law 
Review, p 150.
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thus far”? 55 We could certainly say this would be true if the original proposal 
of the Commission of 2013 had been adopted.56 But the resistance of Member 
States, national parliaments and governments was too strong, and the Commis-
sion’s federal vision was replaced by enhanced cooperation involving 22 Mem-
ber States, with the features of “the usual intergovernmental, collegiate model 
that characterizes a number of current EU judicial cooperation structures”.57
The EPPO Regulation is undoubtedly a great contribution to the develop-
ment of European criminal law, but, on the other hand, it is hard to share the 
conspicuous enthusiasm of some authors because the current model leaves 
some significant, relatively obvious, possibilities for the obstruction of the 
work of the EPPO, mainly through the influence (or, to put it more directly, 
pressure) of national governments on EDPs which is possible mainly due to 
their “double-hat” status. 
Given the “double hat” status to ensure the independence of European 
Delegated Prosecutors in relation to its Member States, it would be more sui-
table for European Delegated Prosecutors to be judges rather than members of 
national public prosecutors’ offices,58 because the independence of judges in 
most Member States is, not only at the normative level but also in reality, better 
protected than that of prosecutors. Consequently, the potential for national 
structures to influence a European Delegated Prosecutor who is also a public 
prosecutor in his/her country is greater than the potential to influence an EDP 
who is a judge. But this solution, although better when it comes to the indepen-
dence of EDPs, is not practical and it brings many problems. The lack of pro-
55 Mitsilegas and Giufrida (n 41) p 19. 
56 Mitsilegas states that “the Commission produced a highly innovative vision of cen-
tralised prosecution at EU level, with echoes of federalism in its use of concepts such as the 
exclusive competence of the EPPO”. V Mitsilegas, “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
Facing National Legal Diversity” in Nowak (n 47) pp 11-33, as cited in Mitsilegas and Giufrida 
(n 41) p 19. Perillo points out that “since the beginning of this legislative process, the European 
Parliament had sensed that things were not on the right track. And today even less so”. As 
evidence of this conclusion, he mentions the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority 
on 29 April 2015 in the Strasbourg plenary which stated first that “the structure of the Euro-
pean Public Prosecutor should be fully independent of national governments and European 
institutions and protected from any influence or political pressure” (para. 7). The Resolution 
then pointed out that “the provisions governing the division of powers between the European 
Public Prosecutor and the national authorities should be clearly defined in order to avoid any 
uncertainty” (para. 12). E. Perillo, “EPPO, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office: European 
Only in Name or also in Law” (2016) 1 Revista Romana de Drept European, pp 88-89.
57 Mitsilegas and Giufrida (n 41) p 19.
58 Art. 17(2) of the Regulation leaves open the possibility not only for members of the 
public prosecution service but also members of the judiciary of the respective Member States 
to be nominated and appointed.
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secutorial competence and experience is one of the main problems of this 
“judge EDP” possibility.
Of course, in most cases where suspects of crimes against the financial 
interests of the EU are not connected with the respective national governments 
or powerful individuals connected with governmental structures, there will 
usually be no problem with the possible pressure on EDPs. But in cases where 
the suspects of crimes against the EU financial interests are persons that have 
political influence and are connected with highly positioned individuals from 
the government, the situation could be complicated. The ability of certain stru-
ctures or powerful high-ranking individuals in the Member States to influence 
the work of the EPPO is primarily due to the “double-hat” status of the EDPs 
and the fact that they, as national prosecutors, are nevertheless part of the hie-
rarchical system. We have mentioned that the EPPO regulation also recognises 
this problem in Art. 17. With respect to disciplinary responsibility and dismi-
ssal, the Regulation distinguishes between the “European” and “national” 
basis for the responsibility of the EDP, and accordingly allocates powers to 
bring proceedings against that same person. The question is what a powerful 
person in the national system can do to prevent the prosecution of a person (e.g. 
his/her high-ranking colleague in a ruling political party) for a crime against 
the EU’s financial interests. For example, it could be the Minister of Justice 
who has various mechanisms of influence over prosecutors in his/her Member 
State. One way is to “have an informal, persuasive conversation” with that 
EDP, asking him/her to forget, neglect, or ruin work on that case. If that EDP 
does not obey the informal request, the corrupt minister should find another 
way to do stop this EDP. As already mentioned, Art. 17(4) of the Regulation 
provides that Member States may not dismiss, or take disciplinary action aga-
inst, a European Delegated Prosecutor for reasons connected with his/her res-
ponsibilities under the Regulation without the consent of the European Chief 
Prosecutor. So, in this situation, the formal ground for disciplinary procee-
dings against this prosecutor in his/her country could relate to his/her work as 
a national prosecutor, concealing the fact that the real reason is his/her work as 
an EDP on a “European case”. This can be done without the consent of 
European Chief Prosecutor. 
So, it is time for us to try to answer Satzger’s question: “Would the Delega-
ted Prosecutor really act objectively and openly against his superior and also 
against colleagues within the internal structure? Can he really be independent 
if he wants to continue a career in the national justice system and needs posi-
tive evaluations insofar?”59 I believe that in the situation where one prosecutor 
“has two masters”, national and European, the influence of the former is much 
stronger, because the Member State and not the EU is the one that provides the 
59 Satzger (n 41) p 74.
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job, the salary, and decides in many ways on his/her position and career in the 
long term. Although the EDP is formally and de lege lata independent and free 
of instructions from anyone in his/her Member State during work on “European 
cases”, hidden pressures on the EDP who is a prosecutor in the national crimi-
nal justice system could be strong and very effective.60 The possibilities of 
addressing this issue within European law are very limited for two reasons. It 
is quite clear that Member States are not ready to accept such a structure of the 
EPPO in which operating prosecutors (in this model, EDPs) would be totally 
independent of Member States. This structure would be the best solution to 
ensure the independence of EDPs from Member States, but it is clear that there 
are no realistic chances for this model to be adopted for political reasons. And 
within this existing model, not much can be done because the independence 
and accountability of EDPs in regard to Member States is primary a matter of 
national law and the position and independence of the national prosecutor’s 
office. All this is regulated by national constitutions and laws and there are 
great differences between Member States in this regard. So, we could curb our 
enthusiasm when it comes to the de facto independence of European Delega-
ted Prosecutors who are prosecutors in their Member State. The only thing that 
could be done within the existing regulatory framework is the following. If the 
EPPO College believes that an EDP has committed serious misconduct wor-
king on a European case as a consequence of pressure coming from his/her 
superiors in his/her Member State, the College can dismiss the EDP for serious 
misconduct pursuant to Art. 17(3) of the Regulation. In this situation, the role 
of the other two members of the Permanent Chamber that are working with the 
respective EDP on that case is crucial but could become troublesome, especia-
lly if they do not understand the language of the case.
Even with these described possible problems with the status of the EDPs, 
the establishment of the EPPO is great step forward in the development of 
European criminal law and protection of the financial interests of the EU.61 But 
we must be aware that the fight for an independent EPPO is not fought only at 
the level of EU law, but also at level of Member States’ internal law. This is so 
because the de facto independence of the EPPO largely depends on the de 
facto independence of EDPs. 
60 Apart from the mentioned possibility of disciplinary proceedings against the EDP for 
“domestic reasons”, the EDP prosecutor could, for example, be threatened with transfer to 
another city or province, depending on the rules of the prosecutors’ position and independence. 
61 Jean Monnet wrote in his memoirs: “Those who do not want to start anything because 
they are not sure that things will go exactly as they had planned are condemning themselves 
to remain immobile. Nobody can say today what will be the institutional framework of Europe 
tomorrow, because future changes that are triggered by today’s changes are unpredictable”, as 
cited in Perillo (n 56) p 95.
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Sažetak
KOLIKO JE URED EUROPSKOG JAVNOG TUŽITELJA „DE FACTO“ NEOVISAN? 
Pitanje neovisnosti Ureda europskog javnog tužitelja jedno je od najvažnijih pitanja koja 
se pojavljuju u vezi s predstojećim početkom rada tog novog tijela Europske unije. Kao što je 
to u pravilu slučaj, pitanja koja su i na nacionalnoj razini složena prenošenjem na razinu EU-a 
dodatno dobivaju na svojoj složenosti uslijed dodatnih problema koji proizlaze i iz odnosa 
nacionalnog prava i prava Europske unije. I dok neovisnost Ureda europskog javnog tužitelja 
nije (ili barem ne bi trebala biti) ugrožena od strane drugih tijela EU-a, kad je riječ o mogućem 
utjecaju država članica koje sudjeluju u ovom programu proširene suradnje na njegovu neovis-
nost, stvari su ponešto drukčije. „Slaba točka“ pritom su europski delegirani tužitelji, odnosno 
njihov status „double hat“, koji uz neke nedvojbene prednosti ima i svoje slabe strane. Položaj 
europskog delegiranog tužitelja slabiji je, a mogućnost pritisaka na njega veća je ako je riječ 
o europskom delegiranom tužitelju koji je u svojoj državi tužitelj (a ne sudac). Razlog tome 
jest činjenica da je neovisnost sudaca u gotovo svim nacionalnim pravnim sustavima u EU-u 
mnogo veća te da su mogući mehanizmi pritisaka predstavnika izvršne ili zakonodavne vlasti 
na tužitelje mnogo veći. Moguće vođenje stegovnih postupaka ili poduzimanja raznih drugih 
manje očitih mjera (npr. uskrate zasluženog napredovanja, premještaja bez suglasnosti u drugo, 
udaljeno mjesto rada i dr.) prema tužiteljima u nekim nacionalnim pravnim sustavima odraža-
vaju se negativno i na neovisnost tih tužitelja kao europskih delegiranih tužitelja. 
Ključne riječi: Ured europskog javnog tužitelja (UEJT), tužiteljska neovisnost, europsko 
kazneno pravo, zaštita financijskih interesa Europske unije
